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1. INTRODUCTION
M
any authors have thought about economic problems outside 
of a comparative statics framework (lachmann 1943, 2007 
[1956],  Shackle  1968,  Garrison  2001,  Koppl  2002,  Wagner  2010, 
Klein 2012). In one way or another their works focus on individual 
choices and expectations made within the market process. This 
paper provides an alternative framework to comparative statics 
theorizing by combining and extending many of these scholars’ 
ideas  into  a  set  of  analytical  tools  for  understanding  market 
phenomena and individual behavior. 
Most  principles  of  microeconomics  textbooks  (Samuelson, 
1948; Mankiw, 2012) are based upon comparative statics and the 
ceteris paribus assumption. Utility maximization subject to budget 
constraints falls under this category, as does calculating income 
and substitution effects given various price changes and utility 
functions. Students learn to calculate equilibrium prices given a 
variety of actors, initial endowments, and utility functions. Even 
basic supply and demand graphs, including elasticity and cross 
elasticity, rely on ceteris paribus. Monopoly, price discrimination, 
and perfect competition are also constructs of comparative statics 
and the ceteris paribus assumption.
Although comparative statics theorizing helps us understand the 
world better and has useful didactic properties, it also has some 
significant  shortcomings.  First,  there  is  little  room  for  modeling 
strategic behavior. Comparative statics describes firms in perfectly 
competitive markets as simply solving math problems. Consumers 
are treated similarly; they simply optimize their utility given fixed 
budget constraints and an array of prices. Even attempts to remedy 
the lack of strategic behavior through game theory fall short because 
in  reality  people’s  payoff  matrices  are  not  fixed  (Ostrom,  2010) 
and they may read more into particular games than the numerical 
payoffs (Smith, 2003). Hayek (1945, 1978) identified this problem by 
explaining that the very purpose of markets, prices, and competition 
is  to  discover  the  relative  costs  of  production,  consumers’  valu-
ations, and relevant payoff structures. The most important social 
questions are not mathematical calculations of profit maximization 
or cost minimization, but the discovery of human wants, productive 
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A second problem is that opportunity costs, and thereby much of 
the data used in comparative statics, is indeterminate until the point 
of choice (Buchanan, 1979). Radical subjectivists, from lachmann 
(1943, 2007 [1956]) to Shackle (1968) to Stringham (2010), argue for 
the inadequacy of traditional utility theorizing. Uncertainty does 
not factor into people’s calculations in the same way that risk does. 
Furthermore, people’s beliefs and expectations about the future 
are influenced by their historical experience and the institutions 
around them. In this regard there is a certain amount of indeter-
minacy and contingency in real world phenomena that do not fit 
well into equilibrium theorizing using comparative statics. 
Wagner (2010) has framed the dichotomy between comparative 
statics  and  emergent  phenomena  as  two  different  methods  of 
theorizing. One method carries on the tradition of leon Walras. 
The other continues the tradition of Carl Menger. Neo-Walrasian 
theorizing focuses on mathematical equations, equilibrium, and 
highly stylized assumptions. Neo-Mengerian theorizing, on the 
other hand, focuses on emergent phenomena—it looks for patterns 
rather  than  clear  specific  predictions.  The  approach  taken  here 
should be viewed as an extension of the neo-Mengerian method.
Of  course,  one  need  not  be  a  radical  subjectivist  to  see  the 
importance  of  understanding  how  people  interpret  reality  and 
make decisions based upon those interpretations. As Hayek (1943) 
points out, in the social sciences “facts” are what people think 
and believe, not fixed material phenomena (Hayek, 1943). That 
claim may seem radical to those economists who spend most of 
their time running regressions and crunching data, trying to find 
relationships  between  variables,  or  those  working  out  complex 
mathematical equations describing how people’s utility functions, 
payoff  matrices,  and  risk-preferences  lead  to  equilibrium  or 
disequilibrium.  Yet  stripping  away  the  many  assumptions  in 
these  comparative  static  models  demonstrates  that  they  ulti-
mately depend upon what things people value, why they value 
them, and how people interpret events around them. Although 
trying to analyze how every single individual makes decisions is 
impractical, some progress may be gained by developing a theory 
of how groups or “types” of individuals understand the world.
lachmann  (1943,  2007  [1956])  discusses  how  people  make 
decisions in the face of price changes and uncertainty. He argues 334 The Quarterly Journal of Austrian Economics 16, No. 3 (2013)
that it is not clear how people will react to a relative price change in 
a non-ceteris paribus world because their response depends on their 
interpretation of reality. If people do not know the future, then it 
is possible that they will interpret a price increase as being the first 
of many, and therefore buy more of that particular good. At first 
glance that behavior violates the law of demand because people 
are buying more of a good as its price rises. But upon reflection 
we realize that they do this because if the price increase is in fact 
the first of many, then the price of that good, relative to its future 
price, has actually fallen. Yet even in this short exercise we have 
assumed that everyone believes the same thing. In reality people 
disagree about how to interpret the same price increase because 
they have access to different amounts of information and have 
different levels of knowledge. 
Instead  of  solving  equilibrium  equations,  price  theory  needs 
to explain how prices emerge in the first place. Price emergence 
theory, then, needs to incorporate the different goals and different 
levels of information and knowledge among market actors. The 
emphasis should be upon how involvement in markets affects an 
actor’s knowledge, information, and expectations. As Koppl (2002) 
argues, theories about human cognition and human institutions 
are essential for understanding how people react to price changes 
and other market signals.
How can we theorize about complex states of the world in which 
the ceteris paribus assumption does not hold and people may react 
to price changes differently from each other? Rather than focusing 
on what particular information a representative agent may have at 
any given moment, we should study the mechanisms of information 
transfer and of learning among diverse individuals. Institutions 
and the various mechanisms at work in particular markets are more 
important than any particular shift in macroeconomic variables. 
Because people’s expectations of the future are influenced by the 
market process, we cannot treat those expectations as exogenous 
(Garrison, 2001; Salerno, 2012). Instead we should look at how 
institutional changes may increase or decrease their uncertainty 
and how they form expectations. 
To deal with these problems, we need to develop three analytical 
tools  to  help  us  understand  people’s  interpretive  frameworks: 
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a theory of interpretive frameworks with the help of those tools. 
Section three then applies the theory of interpretive frameworks 
to recent Federal Reserve policy—particularly to the mystery of 
its  surprising  ineffectiveness  according  to  comparative  static 
theory—by  looking  at  how  changes  in  knowledge  costs,  insti-
tutions,  and  recent  history  affect  how  individuals  interpret  the 
world around them. Section four concludes with comments on the 
relationship between neo-Walrasian theorizing and neo-Mengerian 
theorizing in economics.
2. THEORY OF INTERPRETIVE FRAMEWORKS
once we begin theorizing outside comparative static equilibrium 
models, we run into the problem of how to interpret and analyze 
people’s behavior. We know that they act purposively using various 
means to achieve various ends, but how do they think about those 
means  and  ends? Although  considerations  of  people’s  motives 
and how they choose their ends stray into the realm of psychology 
(Mises, 1949), it is not clear that we can choose to ignore them when 
exploring emergent phenomena using the neo-Mengerian method. 
People’s goals will affect not only their choices of available means, 
but what they even consider to be means. Technology arises from 
creating  new  means  to  achieve  ends  that  could  not  have  been 
realized with prior means. 
Though  we  might  say  that  most  people  value  wealth,  what 
they think of as wealth can vary and have important effects on 
their  choices.  People  who  view  wealth  as  high  portfolio  value 
will  react  to  economic  changes  differently  from  those  who  see 
wealth as a large bank account or those who see wealth as large 
real  estate  holdings  or  owning  cash-generating  businesses.  We 
need to appreciate the variety of people’s ends, beyond simply 
maximizing a mathematical utility function because what a person 
values determines his goals; and his goals affect how he interprets 
the world around him. People’s goals are like a lens that colors 
everything they see. 
The  language  for  interpretive  frameworks  comes  from  lach-
mann’s  (1943,  2007  [1956])  work  on  capital  and  expectations. 
Although  he  does  not  actually  use  the  two  words  together, 
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frameworks  for  understanding  the  world  fit  well  in  the  term: 
“Interpreting  an  event  means  to  fit  it  into  a  picture  of  the 
‘situation,’ a concept of a structure which serves as framework of 
reference” (1943, p. 20). Recently, Klein (2012, p. 96) has used the 
phrase “interpretive framework” to describe how people process 
information—implying asymmetry of interpretation even in the 
face  of  symmetric  information.  Interpretive  frameworks  are  a 
composite of beliefs, feelings, expectations, goals, and knowledge. 
They  are  much  like  the  vision  described  by  Schumpeter  (1987 
[1954]) as a “pre-analytic  cognitive act.” Thomas Sowell writes 
that “vision is a sense of causation” (2007 [1987], p. 6, emphasis 
original) and that “visions are the foundations on which theories 
are built” (ibid., p. 4). Interpretive frameworks include learning, 
expectations, and goals too. But in comparative statics, people’s 
interpretive frameworks are flattened to a few assumptions about 
information, preferences, and market opportunities. This is akin to 
the flattening of knowledge described in Klein (2012). Emergent 
order within the neo-Mengerian framework arises from the inter-
action of many different people’s interpretive frameworks and on 
their ability to adapt to market and social institutions over time.
It  is  difficult  to  break  interpretive  frameworks  into  their 
constituent  parts  without  moving  back  into  the  neo-Walrasian 
world of comparative statics. Yet two general points can be made. 
First,  objective  data  does  not  determine  human  behavior  like 
physical terrain determines the course of a river. People do not act 
based upon numbers but upon what those numbers mean to them. 
Interpretation  is  never  given  or  uniform  when  data  are  mixed 
with local knowledge, beliefs, and individual ends. Hence issues 
of asymmetric interpretation may greatly overshadow issues of 
asymmetric information (Klein, 2012).
Second, beliefs and values may “commit” people to a particular 
expectation or interpretation of reality. In this case better information 
alone may not be enough to change their behavior or beliefs. But 
these commitments may not arise from stupidity or irrationality as 
many have argued (Keynes, 2006 [1936]; Shiller, 2006; Caplan, 2008; 
Akerlof and Shiller, 2010). Knowledge can be embodied in beliefs, 
much like Hayek (1960) and Sowell (1996 [1980], 2007 [1987]) claim 
that knowledge is embedded in traditions. If that is the case, then 
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the world. That does not mean that their beliefs are always right 
or beneficial; but it does mean that there are good reasons not to 
dismiss them as purely fanciful.
These moral, ideological, or philosophical commitments make 
forming a theory of expectations difficult. Yet, they are an important 
part of understanding emergent dynamics and phenomena that 
are not adequately explained with equilibrium or disequilibrium 
theory. There are other heuristics that people use to form expec-
tations about the future and interpret changes in economic data 
such as knowledge proxies and the opinions of others. Although 
these are important in their own right, they are not developed in 
detail here except as they help explain the phenomena at hand.
The first analytical tool that can help us think about the emergent 
dynamics of economic phenomena is the costliness of knowledge. 
Knowledge  differs  from  information  because  it  requires  inter-
pretation and integrating information or data into some theory. 
As I mentioned earlier, two people, facing the same information, 
may make different choices because of their interpretation, their 
knowledge.  Information  and  data  are  the  building  blocks  of 
knowledge—much as lego pieces are the building blocks used to 
create various structures. Just as the blocks can hardly be said to 
determine the final structure and details of the building, so data 
can hardly be said to determine people’s choices or interpretations. 
More building blocks let one build a greater variety of structures, 
while too few prevent one from building any satisfactory structure 
at all. Information cost is subsidiary to knowledge cost; and it is the 
cost of gaining knowledge that will affect the accuracy of people’s 
expectations and their willingness to act. 
Because  of  its  costliness,  people  rarely  engage  in  extensive 
calculation and analysis. Instead they use heuristics and proxies to 
economize on both information and knowledge costs (Gigerenzer, 
2002, 2011). For example, one major influence on people’s expec-
tations  and  beliefs  are  the  expectations  and  beliefs  of  others—
particularly of family, friends, and experts. How influential those 
opinions are may fluctuate in relatively predictable circumstances 
depending on existing institutions and recent historical experience.
Knowledge costs depend on at least three criteria. First, they 
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to be understood. This in turn depends on the number of variables 
involved in the situation as well as the characteristics of those 
variables, whether they are predictable, random, or indeterminate. 
Second, knowledge costs are affected by the availability, and reli-
ability, of data or information. The number and types of blocks 
available affect what kind of structures can be built. Third, the 
opportunity costs of gaining knowledge will fluctuate depending 
on available alternatives. In markets with many profitable oppor-
tunities  or  high  turnover,  the  opportunity  costs  of  developing 
knowledge are higher than in more stable environments.
Koppl’s (2002) theory of big players explains how institutional 
change can lead to higher knowledge costs and increased uncertainty 
which in turn contribute to macroeconomic changes. The decisions 
that individuals make depend upon their view of long-term trends. 
They  also  depend  on  institutions.  Koppl  elaborates  an  idea  of 
“anonymity” that strengthens social cooperation because we do not 
have to know the individual people who serve a particular function. 
For example, I do not have to know the bus driver personally in 
order to trust him to deliver me at my stop or know the mail carriers 
involved in transporting my letter across the country. These people 
are anonymous, yet they serve a particular function in a predictable 
manner which allows me to form realistic expectations at very low 
cost. The clearly defined role reduces the number of variables I need 
to consider. I do not have to make any judgments about a person’s 
mood, motivations, or personal beliefs in order to form accurate 
expectations of how they will perform their role.
The opposite of relatively anonymous actors serving in a specific 
role (bus driver, mailman, barber, etc.) are “Big Players” who are 
not constrained by a specific function or role, or even by normal 
market  discipline.  Big  Players  are  individuals  or  organizations 
who can substantially influence the market by their actions, who 
face relatively weak market discipline (often due to government 
protection through barriers to entry or costly regulation), and who 
have wide discretion when making decisions (Koppl, 2002, p. 120). 
Markets with Big Players become less predictable because rather 
than  having  people  perform  a  particular  role  within  relatively 
stable  and  fixed  institutions—which  means  one  does  not  need 
to  know  their  personal  characteristics  in  order  to  predict  their 
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invest time and energy trying to understand the idiosyncrasies of 
a few individuals or organizations and the potential impact their 
idiosyncrasies can have on the market.
The second analytical tool for Neo-Mengerian theorizing is insti-
tutional  analysis.  Koppl  (2002)  explains  how  herding  behavior, 
or imitation, increases in financial markets because Big Players 
change the existing institutions and introduce more arbitrariness. 
The relative costs of gaining knowledge and the value of different 
proxies change in that environment. In the case of markets charac-
terized by (a) Big Player(s), such as financial markets in the face of 
the Federal Reserve and the credit rating agencies, people attribute 
high levels of importance to the views of the Big Player and devote 
substantial effort to predicting his future actions. Because of the 
difficulty and costliness of doing this, they tend to imitate those 
around them more. They try to “free-ride” on what they suppose to 
be the due diligence of others. The amount of uncertainty and vari-
ability in economic phenomena can increase or decrease depending 
on the presence of Big Players. He concludes that “Expectations will 
be more prescient in some environments than in others” (2002:7). 
Which means that neo-Walrasian theorizing that treats people’s 
expectations (whether static, adaptive, or rational) as exogenous is 
bound to fail sooner or later as the market environment changes; 
and with it how people form expectations.
Within the neo-Mengerian method of theorizing, on the other 
hand, institutions (including government policies) matter (Hayek, 
1960; North, 1994). Not only do they affect the data of the market, 
such as allowing competition or protecting monopolists, sometimes 
fixing prices or wages, tax levels, etc., they also have an important 
influence on how people think and what they expect. As Koppl 
argues, “Expectations depend on institutions” (2002, p. 96). The 
way  that  people  interpret  the  world  around  them  will  depend 
in large part on the stability of rules and others’ behavior. One 
might also say that institutions are an extension of interpretive 
frameworks  because  they  filter  and  distribute  information  and 
other market signals. Institutions, including norms and informal 
rules, also affect how well specific roles, such as “bus driver” or 
“barber,” are defined. When institutions deteriorate, specific roles 
become less clearly defined and people face much greater uncer-
tainty when making choices. 340 The Quarterly Journal of Austrian Economics 16, No. 3 (2013)
History is full of examples of how market structures and indi-
vidual behavior change rapidly after governments violate a long-
standing institution, such as the soundness of its currency, honoring 
its debts, or protection of private property—almost always in the 
direction of deterioration and stagnation. As I will explore in the 
next section, recent Federal Reserve behavior and the Troubled 
Asset Relief Program represent similar violations of long-standing 
institutions—thus changing market characteristics and individual 
behavior as people try to adjust their interpretive frameworks to 
deal with the greater uncertainty and difficulty of understanding 
the motives behind the actions of a distinctive Big Player rather 
than the simpler motivations of a “type” of actor (Koppl, 2002). 
Not surprisingly then, institutions can promote or hinder stability 
and thereby change both the location and the speed of convergence 
to competitive equilibria in the neo-Walrasian framework.
A  third  analytical  tool  for  theorizing  in  the  neo-Mengerian 
tradition  is  recent  history.  Experience  and  memory  are  crucial 
aspects of people’s interpretive frameworks. The contingency and 
personal relevancy of recent historical events will often give a more 
accurate depiction of the world than theorizing about mathematical 
calculations like Bayesian updating or rational expectations. What 
people learn from history is a matter of interpretation and therefore 
diverse, as can be seen clearly in the ongoing debates about the 
causes and nature of the Great Depression. History requires theory 
to give it meaning and structure (Mises, 1949, 2007; Coyne, 2013, p. 
58). That is as true for the individual, whether he understands it or 
not, as it is for the economist or historian.
A non-mathematical view of learning and interpretation allows 
for  the  passage  of  time  to  impact  what  people  remember  and 
therefore what they believe and expect. Recent experience looms 
larger in men’s minds than more distant history. Although how 
people feel about and view a situation depends on much more 
than simply the passage of time, the effects of forgetfulness cannot 
be totally dismissed. How valuable someone thinks it is to avoid 
repeating a particular mistake in the future will influence how 
much he invests in retaining particular memories.
Understanding how people form and use interpretive frameworks 
is essential for theorizing in the neo-Mengerian tradition. Indi-
vidual beliefs and goals, along with institutions, incentives, and 341 Paul D. Mueller: The Theory of Interpretive Frameworks: Ceteris Non Paribus
recent history all play a role in how people interact with each 
other and the world. The three tools I have outlined are the costs 
of knowledge, institutional analysis, and recent historical context. 
In the next section I use these tools to assess the recent divergence 
between comparative static analysis of the effects of recent Federal 
Reserve policy and its actual effects.
3.   FEDERAL RESERVE POLICY IN A NEO-
MENGERIAN FRAMEWORK
Coyne  (2008)  points  out  in  the  context  of  development  that 
theorizing about the “meta-game” of society or social aggregates 
may be misleading if there are many “nested” games that collec-
tively make up the meta-game. For example, the meta-game in 
the loanable funds market is that when interest rates fall, people 
will borrow and invest more. But which people? Neo-Mengerian 
theorizing  focuses  on  individual  actors  and  how  they  perceive 
the nested “game” that they are playing. They are not trying to 
solve the meta-game as many economic theories have them doing. 
Distinguishing between meta (macro) theorizing and micro theo-
rizing explains the divergence between their predictions about the 
effects of Federal Reserve policy and the reality.
The  Federal  Reserve  has  been  expanding  the  monetary  base 
and  keeping  the  Federal  Funds  Rate  artificially  low  since  late 
2007 (Figure 1). Although the specific justifications for this huge 
intervention into financial markets have varied from preventing 
systemic collapse to easing liquidity constraints to encouraging 
lending and borrowing, the ultimate goal has always been to lower 
unemployment by increasing economic output. Nearly every neo-
Walrasian macro-economic theory says that monetary expansion 
should increase output because the price of borrowing has fallen. 
That fall in price means, by assumption, that the quantity demanded 
will increase, which will lead to more investment and production. 
Even if they disagree about the wisdom of the Fed’s policy of 
artificial monetary expansion and how long its effects will last, 
neo-Keynesian (Clarida, Gali, and Gertler, 1999; Mankiw, 2012), 
Monetarist (Friedman, 1968), neo-Classical (Goodfriend, 2004), and 
Austrian (Mises, 1949; White, 2009; Woods, 2009; Salerno, 2012) 
macroeconomic theories all suggest that recent monetary policy 342 The Quarterly Journal of Austrian Economics 16, No. 3 (2013)
should have had more significant economic effects than it has had 
thus far. I am speaking of these theories as they were before 2008. 
Since then most economists have adjusted their models to explain 
the surprising results of monetary policy in the past five years.
One might argue that rational expectations explains the inef-
fectiveness of current Fed policy. Although that is part of the story, 
it is incomplete and somewhat misleading because rational expec-
tations in a neo-Walrasian sense has significant theoretical problems. 
Why, for example, should people always have an unbiased view of 
the future? Or more importantly, why were rational expectations 
almost totally absent in the years leading up to the 2008 financial 
crisis? We see examples of systemic miscalculation both with regard 
to financial asset values as well as housing prices. Arguments that 
relevant  information  was  simply  unavailable  at  the  time  seem 
rather implausible (Shiller, 2006; Shiller and Akerlof, 2010). 
So why is it that people were largely “fooled” or “misled” by the 
Fed’s behavior and other economic trends in the years preceding 
the crisis, but now they seem largely immune from Fed policy? The 
Fed engaged in aggressive monetary expansion to lower interest 
rates during the recession of 01–02 (Appendix, Figure 1). At that 
time,  the  monetary  expansion  had  a  strong  positive  effect  on 
economic growth. Additional government policies that prevented 
housing prices and housing starts from declining also played a role 
in reducing the severity of the downturn (Woods, 2009, p. 81). But 
during and after the 2008 crisis, the federal government engaged 
in  similar  policies  of  low  interest  rates,  stimulus,  and  policies 
promoting housing with little effect. Why were the effects so much 
smaller this second time around?
We need to be careful that our explanation does not fall prey to 
the centralized mindset (Resnick, 1997). Complex phenomena do 
not often have single central causes. Usually there are numerous 
factors involved that lead to a particular outcome through their 
interaction.  There  was  far  more  adjustment  of  interpretive 
frameworks  and  expectations  after  the  recent  financial  crisis 
than  there  was  after  the  internet  bubble.  Those  adjustments  in 
interpretation explain, in large part, why Fed policy has had such 
different effects in the past couple of years than it did a decade ago. 
People’s expectations can become more or less rational depending 
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answer this question by looking at several factors including the 
changing costs of knowledge, the shifting institutional framework, 
and learning from recent historical context (Table 1).
Table 1.   Loanable Funds and Financial Markets 
   Pre-2008
 Knowledge Costs  Peer Pressure / 
   Irrational Exuberance
   High opportunity costs
   Economic proxies 
   fuel optimism
 Institutions  Basel I & II
   Community Reinvestment Act
   Shadow Banking
 Recent History  Greenspan Put (LTCM, 
   Asian Crisis)
   Rapid appreciation of 
   house values
   Steady growth in 
   stock markets
     Today
     “Open Mouth” 
     monetary policy
     Artificially low 
     interest rates
     Awareness of future 
     bubbles valued
     Dodd-Frank increases 
     regulatory regime
     Bailouts (TARP), 
     Fannie, & Freddie
     Stress Tests
     Major financial crisis
     Large write-downs 
     in portfolios
     Popped asset bubbles
How people perceive the costs and benefits of knowledge will 
be a function of institutions, history, and the characteristics of the 
phenomena they are trying to understand. We will look at several 
important factors that influence the costs and benefits of gaining 
knowledge about borrowing and investing. First, people perceive 
the  value  of  having  accurate  knowledge  about  the  movement 
of asset prices—particularly to avoid investing in a speculative 
bubble—to have risen because of their recent experiences during 
the 2008 financial crisis and subsequent recession. This, in turn, has 
led many people to become more alert to artificial credit expansion 
and asset bubbles (Kirzner, 1978). 
Not only do people perceive a greater benefit to discovering 
artificial credit expansion, inflation, and asset bubbles, the Federal 
Reserve has made it less costly to understand its current actions. 
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proactively  (i.e.  artificially)  lower  interest  rates  until  certain 
unemployment  targets  are  reached  (Bernanke,  2012).  His  claim 
of manipulating interest rates is easily confirmed by the fact that 
current interest rates are the lowest that the United States has ever 
experienced.  These  “open  mouth”  operations  make  it  easier  to 
know what the Fed is doing now. The future, however, is another 
matter. The Fed’s commitment to future policy actions is not very 
credible because they have so much discretion. It is easier for people 
to know what the Fed is doing today than what it will do, or what 
the consequences of its actions will be, tomorrow. Is it any surprise, 
then, that individuals and investors are less willing to borrow now 
and expand investment; even at attractive interest rates?
The hesitancy to borrow also stems from the fact that many people 
saw  their  net  worth  decrease  substantially  during  the  financial 
crisis—either because of the fall in stock prices or the decline in 
housing prices. They also probably know friends and neighbors who 
foreclosed on their mortgages or declared bankruptcy. Experiencing 
loss can affect people’s optimism and expectations, such as seeing 
more risk around them, but it may also affect their risk preferences 
and how much they value avoiding loss. Their uncertainty about 
future  economic  conditions  likely  increased  after  the  2008  crisis 
because of their historical experience, their awareness of interest 
rates being artificially low, and their uncertainty about the future.
There have been two important institutional shifts in the role 
that government regulators and agencies play in financial markets 
since  2008.  The  first  shift  came  from  the  Troubled Asset  Relief 
Program (TARP) bailing out too-big-to-fail banks (and nonbanks). 
Besides the obvious problems of moral hazard involved in such 
intervention, there is also destruction of the information and signals 
that are normally transmitted through losses and bankruptcy. The 
second shift is the largely unprecedented growth of government 
intervention in financial markets through the Dodd-Frank financial 
reform bill. Both shifts have reduced people’s willingness to invest 
because they make the future performance of financial markets 
less certain and because they undermine confidence in the stability 
of the “rules of the game” (White, 2009, 2010; Allison, 2012; Pierce 
and Broughel, 2012).
The  first  institutional  shift  of  insuring  too-big-to-fail  financial 
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firms  who  use  resources  inefficiently.  That  safety  net  has  many 
effects in financial markets. First, it creates incentives for bankers to 
make riskier investments because they are insulated from most of 
the potential downside. Second, shareholders and creditors are less 
likely to scrutinize the operations of banks because they know that 
their investments are more or less insured by the Federal Reserve. 
Finally, the subsidies provided by the Federal Reserve in terms of 
low cost lending and purchasing “toxic” assets from the banks will 
distort the price signals for allocating capital within the economy.
The second institutional shift of greater regulation is likely to 
have  even  greater  effects  than  the  first  shift.  The  legislation  of 
Dodd-Frank makes the Federal Reserve an even bigger Big Player in 
financial markets. Their discretionary authority has been expanded 
and  has  no  clear  boundary  (White,  2010;  Pierce  and  Broughel, 
2012). Bankers and investors now face market conditions where 
new rules and regulations could appear at any time. Furthermore, 
the murkiness and volume of regulatory authority makes it difficult 
to hold the Federal Reserve accountable for how it implements 
its policies—opening the door for arbitrary enforcement. Finally, 
the  cost  of  complying  with  these  regulations  has  continued  to 
skyrocket—imposing a greater relative burden on smaller banks 
and  financial  firms—which  has  changed  and  will  continue  to 
change the makeup of the market towards larger firms. 
Though the Fed has been more open about many of its policies 
under Bernanke than it was under Greenspan, it can still change 
them, and financial markets, at any time. Greater “transparency” 
of Fed policy has failed to offset its increasing status as a Big Player 
because the Fed lacks credible commitment and its policies can be 
subject to rapid and unilateral change. Investors continue to shift 
their efforts from market analysis to analyzing past, present, and 
future Fed policy. Investors, lenders, and borrowers, instead of 
making judgments about impersonal market trends and forces, are 
trying to understand the individual motivations, beliefs, and goals 
of particular individuals at the Fed. 
We can see how history affects institutions, which in turn affect 
the relative costs and benefits of behavior in the case of banks. 
They have more than a trillion dollars in excess reserves (Figure 
2). Yet as we dig into the details, this seemingly erratic or non-
optimal situation, from the perspective of market clearing, is quite 346 The Quarterly Journal of Austrian Economics 16, No. 3 (2013)
reasonable. First, we should consider the constraints and incentives 
that  banks,  or  rather  people  within  banks,  face. After  the  2008 
financial crisis many regulators, from the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) to the Federal Reserve to the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation (FDIC), have made it far more difficult for 
bankers to use discretion when originating or renegotiating loans. 
Many regulators were criticized for being too lax prior to 2008. 
In response they have increased their rules and enforcement on 
bank loans. In this environment, banks have less flexibility and 
discretion, which makes it more difficult for them to lend money 
(Allison, 2012).
Another reason that banks are more hesitant to lend is because 
their assessment of risk has changed. After all of the problems with 
defaults, foreclosures, and bankruptcies, bankers are less willing 
to consider higher-risk loans. Their interpretive frameworks have 
changed due to their recent historical experiences. From their new 
perspectives on risk, there is a dearth of profitable loan opportu-
nities. on the other hand, the low rate of return on loans, due to low 
interest rates, also reduces their margin for error on issued loans. 
Where does all this theorizing about the Fed and expectations leave 
us? First, we see massive and unprecedented excess bank reserves 
(Appendix, Figure 2), a large monetary base (Appendix, Figure 3), 
and historically low interest rates (Appendix, Figure 1). Contrary to 
comparative static models in the neo-Walrasian framework, we also 
see little change in the volume of loans originated and few signs of 
inflation (Appendix, Figure 4). That is not to say that there are no 
distortions occurring in financial markets due to Fed policy or that 
inflationary pressure does not exist, only that we are not seeing it in 
ways that macroeconomic models have predicted.
Second, we have seen slow growth over the past few years and 
a relatively weak recovery, which suggests that Federal Reserve 
policy  has  been  surprisingly  ineffective  in  accomplishing  its 
goals of robust economic growth and low unemployment. Many 
economists are puzzled that they cannot square the predictions of 
their models with reality. They are missing the fact that historical 
contingency,  institutional  change,  and  knowledge  costs  have 
caused people’s analytical frameworks to violate the ceteris paribus 
assumption  in  economists’  models.  What  people  expect  has 
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price changes in credit markets. People’s views of risk, their fear 
of new asset bubbles, the change in institutions to greater arbitrary 
government intervention, and uncertainty about future Big Player 
decisions, have substantially altered the environment in financial 
markets. Neo-Walrasian theorizing has come up largely short. The 
neo-Mengerian framework, on the other hand, is better suited to 
understand  how  the  current  emergent  outcomes—institutional, 
historical, and interpretational—have come about and what they 
may imply for future market developments.
4. CONCLUSION
The argument of this paper is not that comparative statics should be 
banned from classrooms or economics textbooks. The neo-Walrasian 
framework  has  many  useful  didactic  and  analytical  properties. 
What has been argued here is that economists should acknowledge 
the limits of comparative statics and the ceteris paribus assumption, 
rather than try to make their models more complex. Many important 
economic phenomena are emergent, particularly at the level of the 
macro economy. The alternate neo-Mengerian framework should be 
used to understand such emergent phenomena.
This paper has stressed the importance of people’s interpretations 
of  reality  using  their  analytical  frameworks.  Knowledge,  beliefs, 
values, expectations, and learning all impact how people view the 
world—including how they assess relative price changes. The tools 
outlined above: knowledge costs, institutions, and recent historical 
context, can help us understand emergent phenomena, as illustrated 
by the brief analysis of how people have reacted to recent Federal 
Reserve policy. Although the lack of precision in neo-Mengerian 
theorizing is troubling, it is still more accurate than neo-Walrasian 
theorizing when explaining emergent phenomena. As Carveth Read 
(1906) noted, “It is better to be vaguely right than exactly wrong.” 348 The Quarterly Journal of Austrian Economics 16, No. 3 (2013)
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